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We assess, via system GMM, how Stock Flow Adjustments (SFA) affect the debt-to-GDP ratio 
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The biggest driver of public debt increases is not primary deficits, nor output, nor 
interest payments. Instead, the main driver is large stock flow adjustments (SFAs), the residual 
term in a traditional debt decomposition exercise (Jalles, Jaramillo, Mulas-Granados, 2017). 
These SFAs can be considered as blind spots in public debt dynamics because they cannot be 
properly modelled or accurately forecasted (Jaramillo, Kimani and Mulas-Granados, 2017). 
Moreover, they are typically associated with a lack of transparency in fiscal accounts (Weber, 
2012). 
 Many public finance scholars have explored the drivers of debt increases, but the 
analysis of SFAs in debt dynamics and the relationship between them and fiscal frameworks 
and institutions, within a fiscal reaction function framework, has received little attention. This 
is a particularly relevant policy question since fiscal frameworks and institutions – which are 
meant at constraining the behaviour of governments1 – can lead to creative accounting to 
circumvent such aspects (Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). 
Among the initial papers that have studied the role of SFAs on public debt accumulation, 
the most comprehensive article is the one by Campos, Jaimovich and Panizza (2006), who 
assembled a dataset of debt spikes in 117 countries for the period 1972 to 2003. They concluded 
that debt spikes have little to do with budget deficits, but instead arise from stock flow 
adjustments, which can be partly explained by contingent liabilities and balance sheet effects. 
However, they noted that these two components only explain 20 percent of the intra-country 
variance of SFA, and concluded that there is still much that we do not understand about SFA.  
In addition, Abbas et al. (2011) looked at 60 episodes of debt increases between 1880–
2007 and found that key contributors to public debt surges during non-recessionary periods 
were both primary deficits and stock-flow adjustments. Finally, Weber (2012), using data for 
163 countries between 1980 and 2010, showed that stock-flow adjustments were a significant 
source of debt increases, while they played only a minor role in explaining debt decreases. SFAs 
could only be partly explained by balance sheet effects and the realization of contingent 
liabilities, and significant differences existed in average stock-flow adjustments across 
countries reflecting country-specific factors. Weber concluded that fiscal transparency has a 
major role to play in this area since fiscally transparent countries tend to have a smaller 
magnitude of SFA in their debt increases.  
                                                          
1 These types of mechanisms, watchdogs or rules are introduced to reduce rent-seeking behavior of policy makers, 
to mitigate common pool problems and prevent undesirable fiscal outcomes (von Hagen, 2002). 
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Using a sample of European Union countries, Von Hagen and Wolff (2006)  - the paper 
closest to ours - show how governments use SFA (a form of creative accounting according to 
their paper) to circumvent the fiscal rules put in place by the European Economic and Monetary 
Union. They emphasize the need to improve fiscal transparency and reinforce the monitoring 
of these supranational rules, to reduce off-budget operations. 
 Against this background, this paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, 
compared with von Hagen and Wolff (2006) we increase the time span covered by adding 10 
more years and run our analysis for the period 1985-2014. Second, while previous literature has 
largely focused on advanced economies or a sample of European countries, we extend the 
coverage to include also emerging and low-income countries, an aspect previously unexplored. 
In addition to inspecting the role of fiscal rules in affecting SFAs, we go deeper in the analysis 
by looking at different types and design characteristics of those rules. Furthermore, for a 
subsample of countries, we rely on a recent dataset on fiscal institutions (Gupta and Ylautinen, 
2014) and inspect which matter the most for the build-up of SFAs. 
 Our main findings are: i) SFAs contribute to the change in the level of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio with a coefficient close to one. ii) Fiscal rules in general did not led governments to a 
systematic use SFAs to lower deficits in our country sample. iii) Countries with some form of 
macro-fiscal forecasting tool in place have allowed governments to use SFAs to lower deficit. 
iv) The existence of fiscal rules in which monitor compliance exist, contributes to lower the 
debt level, although the cyclical deficit partly counteracts this desirable effect. v) The 
magnitude of the fall in the debt ratio due to the presence of fiscal rules before the crisis was 
between 1.7-4.2 percent of GDP. vi) After the Global and Financial Crisis (GFC), revenue and 
debt-based rules contributed positively to the accumulation of debt, a fact that is reinforced via 
large SFAs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the key 
accounting identity on the decomposition of government debt changes. Section 3 provides 
details on the empirical methodology and data. Section 4 discusses the main empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
  
2. Accounting Identity 
The standard equation for decomposing debt changes (see Escolano, 2010 for further 




𝐷 − 𝐷 = ∑  𝐷 + ∑ 𝑑 + ∑ 𝑠𝑓𝑎 .      (1) 
 
Equation (1) states that the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio (𝐷 − 𝐷 ) between time 0 
and time T, is the sum of three components: (i) the product of the lagged debt ratio (𝐷 ) and 
the difference between the nominal effective interest rate on debt (𝑟 ) and the nominal GDP 
growth rate (𝐺 ), cumulated over the years under scrutiny; (ii) the cumulative government 
deficit to GDP (𝑑 ); and (iii) a cumulative stock-flow adjustment (𝑠𝑓𝑎 ) or debt-deficit 
adjustment term which captures valuation effects and “below-the-line” fiscal-financial 
operations (for example financial sector recapitalization, or privatizations receipts or the impact 
of exchange rate changes on foreign denominated debt), as well as errors and omissions.2 In 
von Hagen and Wolff’s (2006) simpler notation, we have: 
 
𝐷 − 𝐷 − 𝑑 = 𝑠𝑓𝑎  .                       (2) 
 
 A positive SFA means that the stock of government debt has risen between period t and 
(t-1) by more than the budget deficit recorded in period t. Typical official definitions tend to 
treat SFA as a statistical residual, which should cancel out over time. However, “large and 
persistent stock-flow adjustments (especially if they always have a negative impact on debt 
developments) should give cause for concern, as they may be the result of the inappropriate 
recording of budgetary operations and can lead to large ex-post upward revisions in deficit 
levels” (EC, 2003, pp. 79). 
 
3. Empirical Methodology and Data 
3.1 Empirical Approach 
According to Milesi-Ferretti´s (2003) fiscal rules (and to our larger purposes, fiscal 
frameworks and institutions) may induce governments to engage in “bad” or even “ugly” 
creative accounting. To empirically test this proposition, we study the relation between deficits 
and SFAs in a large panel of countries between 1985-2014. 
                                                          
2 This debt decomposition measures only the direct effect of real GDP on the denominator of the debt to GDP 
ratio. It does not, however, measure the indirect effects of real GDP growth on other subcomponents (such as the 
primary balance and SFA), which could be significant. For example, Bova et al. (2016) find that realizations of 
contingent liabilities (often reflected in SFA) tend to occur during periods of economic stress. 
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Looking at equation (2) above, the change of the public debt level in percent of GDP in 
country i at time t (∆𝑏 = (𝐷 − 𝐷 )/𝑌 ) is the sum of SFA in percent of GDP (𝑠𝑓𝑎 ) and 
the deficit in percent of GDP (𝑑 ). If one takes the following equation: 
 
∆𝑏 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 𝑠𝑓𝑎 + 𝜀          (3) 
 




Assuming that 𝛼 = 1 implies that the covariance between deficits and SFAs is zero. A 
coefficient smaller (larger) than one implies a negative (positive) covariance between 𝑠𝑓𝑎 and 
𝑑. Borrowing from von Hagen and Wolff (2996), the following reduced-form regression 
equation will be used to empirically estimate the impact of fiscal frameworks and institutions: 
 
∆𝑏 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 𝑠𝑓𝑎 + 𝛼 𝐹𝐼 + 𝛼 𝑠𝑓𝑎 ∗ 𝐹𝐼 + 𝜑 + 𝜀                  (4) 
 
where 𝐹𝐼  is our fiscal framework or institution proxy, 𝜑  are country fixed effects to account 
for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and 𝜀  is a disturbance term satisfying standard 
conditions of zero mean and constant variance. If the hypothesis of no relation between 𝑠𝑓𝑎 
and 𝑑 holds true and 𝛼 = 1, the coefficient 𝛼  measures directly the covariance between 
deficits and SFAs when a given fiscal framework or institution is in place. If 𝛼 < 0 then an 
increase in the SFA would lower the deficit. 
 To separate the effects of structural from cyclically adjusted deficits, we run an 
alternative regression equation, given by: 
 
∆𝑏 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑑 + 𝛽 𝐹𝐼 + 𝛽 𝑑 ∗ 𝐹𝐼 + 𝜑 + 𝜀 .                  (5) 
 
The treatment effect of 𝐹𝐼 can be identified by the coefficient 𝛽 . A negative value of this 
coefficient means that an increase in deficits leads to a lower SFA as a consequence of the 
presence of a given 𝐹𝐼. Coefficients 𝛽  and 𝛼  should have the same sign as they reflect the 
same covariance. To uncover the effect of the structural and cyclical part of the deficit, equation 
(5) is augmented as follows: 
 




where 𝑑  is the cyclically adjusted deficit while 𝑑  denotes the cyclical component. Milesi-
Ferretti (2003) model predicts 𝛾  to have a larger coefficient than 𝛾  as creative accounting is 
expected to be more strongly used during bad times. 
 The models described above are reduced-forms and do not allow making causal 
statements or even quantifying the clean effect of SFAs on debt, meaning that the use of 
instruments is required. While adding other covariates partly corrects for these biases, 
endogeneity can still arise from other omitted variables (unobserved heterogeneity and selection 
effects), measurement errors in variables and reverse causality (simultaneity). Since causality 
can run in both directions, some of the right-hand-side regressors may be correlated with the 
error term. Our equations are first estimated using Generalized Method of Moments estimator 
with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. The first-differenced Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator can behave poorly if time series are persistent (which is 
the case for debt). Hence, we use the more efficient system GMM estimator that exploits 
stationarity restrictions. This method jointly estimates Equation (6) in first differences, using as 
instruments lagged levels of the dependent and independent variables, and in levels, using as 
instruments the first differences of the regressors (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998).3 GMM estimators are unbiased, and compared with ordinary least squares or fixed 
effects (within-group) estimators, exhibit the smallest bias and variance (Arellano and Bond, 
1991).4 
As robustness checks we also employ alternative estimators. More specifically, we rely on 
pooled Ordinary Least Squares, panel within-group estimator and bias-corrected least-squares 
dummy variable (LSDV-C) estimator by Bruno (2005).5   
 
 
                                                          
3 We equally tried estimating the key equations with a difference GMM estimator but decided against it because 
the lagged dependent variable was not significant. Moreover, the tenor of the results is very similar to the system 
GMM. More specifically, we run the two-step system-GMM estimator with Windmeijer standard errors. The 
significance of the results is robust to different choices of instruments and predetermined variables. 
4 As far as information on the choice of lagged levels (differences) used as instruments in the difference (level) 
equation, as work by Bowsher (2002) and, more recently, Roodman (2009) have indicated, when it comes to 
moment conditions (as thus to instruments) more is not always better. The GMM estimators are likely to suffer 
from “overfitting bias” once the number of instruments approaches (or exceeds) the number of groups/countries 
(as a simple rule of thumb). In the present case, the validity of instruments was examined using Sargan’s test of 
overidentifying restrictions. Intuitively, the system GMM estimator does not rely exclusively on the first-
differenced equations, but exploits also information contained in the original equations in levels. 
5 Kiviet (1995) used asymptotic expansion techniques to approximate the small sample bias of the standard LSDV 
estimator for samples where N is small or only moderately large. Bruno (2005) extended the bias approximation 
formulas to accommodate unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous selection rule. 
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3.2 Data and Stylized Facts 
Our sample, for which the macro data come from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database, covers 65 countries observed over the period 1985-2014. We also rely on IMF´s WEO 
measures of the cyclically adjusted balance (deficit) and use it to construct the structural 
component and the difference with the unadjusted balance (deficit). 
We use equation (2) similarly to notably von Hagen and Wolff (2006) to compute the data 
on the SFA. Following this method, we compared the final debt level as of 2014 with the 
accumulated deficits (that is, the sum of the debt level at the first year of available data – which 
may differ from country to country – and all budget deficits between that first year and 2014, 
as a percentage of 2014 GDP). These computations are displayed in Figure 1 for all countries 
covered in our analysis. It shows that most countries have regularly had positive, and is comes 
case, quite large SFAs over time. For instance, Finland and Luxembourg have 68 and 41 
percentage points of GDP more debt than their budget data suggest, respectively. SFAs are 




In addition, Figure 2 exemplifies the accounting identity for some countries, on a yearly 
basis, where we show the specific relevance and magnitude of the stock flow adjustment, which 
tend to be rather persistent over time in many cases, therefore blurring to some extent the link 




For fiscal rules as well as their types and characteristics, we make use of the datasets created 
by the IMF. The first dataset was introduced by Schaechter et al. (2012) and its most recent 
available updates discussed in detail by Lledó et al. (2017). The rules are classified according 
to the following typology: expenditure rules (ER), revenue rules (RR), budget balance rules 
(BBR) and debt rules (DR). Additionally, we created a dummy variable FR_1, denoting the 
existence of any of these fiscal rules in a given country in a given year. Moreover, the dataset 
contains information on such features of the rules as existing escape clauses, enforcement 
procedures or independent monitoring councils or their transparency.  
In the analysis, we include 65 countries, which had at least one of the rules in place during 
the period of analysis. Overall, during the 31 years of the timespan at least one rule in place 
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was observed in 1076 cases (on 2015 possible), the most frequent being the budget balance rule 
(974 cases), followed by debt rule (772 occurrences), expenditure rule (399), the least frequent 
being the revenue rule (186). Only a handful of countries (Germany, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, and Singapore) had at least one rule in place for the entire time span. In all of these 
cases, it was the balanced budget rule, additionally completed by an expenditure rule (for 
Germany) and debt rule (in Malaysia). If a given rule was in place, the debt rule was present in 
a given country for almost 16.5 years, balanced budget rule for 15.7 years, revenue rule for 13.3 
years (but it was present only in 13 countries) and expenditure rule for 9.7 years. The dataset 
additionally contains information about monitoring, enforcement and escape clause for each 
type of rules. We use this data on somewhat more aggregate level, i.e., if any of the fiscal rules 
applied in a country had a monitoring of compliance in place, the variable FR_monitor assumes 
value 1 and zero otherwise. The same is the case for formal enforcement procedure and escape 
clauses whereas independent monitoring body and transparency are taken “as they are” from 
the IMF database.6 
As far as fiscal rules are concerned we can plot the absolute number of new rules (of any 
type) over time by income group, and we get the pattern observed in Figure 3. Looking at 
Advanced Economies, while countries have implemented fiscal rules since the mid-1980s, most 
of them followed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (in adherence to the EU convergence criteria) 
as well as after the Global Financial Crisis. In non Advanced Economies, the absolute number 
of fiscal rules is lower than the advanced economies sample, and most of them were 




Gupta and Yläoutinen (2014) made available another dataset on fiscal rules, which we also 
use. They analyse fiscal institutional frameworks in G-20 economies complemented by six low-
income countries (Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia). In 
particular, aspects covered in this database include: fiscal reporting (fr), macro fiscal forecasting 
(mf), independent fiscal agency (ifa), fiscal objectives (fo), medium term budget framework 
                                                          
6 The most frequent and relatively persistent design feature is the existence of an enforcement mechanism, which 
was in place in 28 countries on average for slightly more than 10 years. Marginally least popular is monitoring (25 
countries, on average in place for 9.6 years), Transparency requirements were present in 21 countries, notably on 
average for the longest period, i.e. for almost 11 years. Independent monitoring body was in place in 22 countries, 
but as a relatively recent mechanism, its average duration only slightly exceeds 5 years. Finally, some form of 
escape clause is present in 12 countries, on average for 7.5 years. 
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(mbf), budget execution (be), understanding the scale and scope of the fiscal challenge 
(understanding), developing a credible fiscal strategy (developing) and implementing the fiscal 
strategy through the budget process (implementing). Except for ifa, which is present only in 17 
out of the 26 countries, all of these institutions are to a smaller or larger extent present in at 
least 24 countries.7 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Baseline with Fiscal Rules 
We start by estimating equations 4 and 5 for the different fiscal rules proxies using the 
entire sample of countries and time span. Results are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
Starting with Table 1, we observe that SFAs, as the accounting identity suggests, contribute to 
the change in the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio with a coefficient close to one. The existence 
of a fiscal rule leads of a fall in the debt level but the coefficient estimate is not statistically 
different from zero (specification 1). Since the coefficient on the SFA is not statistically 
different from one, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms represent the covariances 
between the SFA and the deficit when a specific rule or a rule with a certain characteristic is in 
place. In the cases of the rules FRmonitor, indepmonit and transp the interaction term comes 
out positive but with a small magnitude and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Contrary to the evidence presented in von Hagen and Wolff (2006)  - who used a different 
definition for the fiscal rule dummy variable, closer to an event study approach, for a smaller 
country group - these findings suggest that fiscal rules in general did not led governments to 
systematically use SFAs to lower deficits in our sample of 65 countries. Moreover, in Table 2 
we still have that fiscal rules do not statistically significantly affect the change in the debt level. 
As in Table 1, a positive covariance appears. An increase in the deficit by one percentage point 
is associated with an increase of the SFA by an amount between [0.4-1.3] depending on the 







                                                          
7 Descriptive statistics are presented in the Appendix.  
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4.2. Baseline with Fiscal Institutions 
In Table 3 we re-estimate equations 4 and 5 using the smaller sample stemming from 
Gupta and Yläoutinen (2014) on fiscal frameworks. Still we obtain that in general fiscal rules 
did not significantly change the debt level in this group of 26 countries. Those countries 
containing a form of macro-fiscal forecasting tool (mf) seemed to have allowed governments to 
use SFAs to lower deficits (the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level).  
A better and improved expectational view of the economy and public finances, suggests 
that SFAs have become a policy variable to control the deficit in countries where such 
framework was in place. All other characteristics of the fiscal system do not seem to matter 
neither individually nor in conjunction with the SFA variable. Results from estimating equation 
5 in this setting yield statistically insignificant coefficients and, as hence, are omitted for reasons 




4.3 Augmented Version with Fiscal Rules 
In order to assess to what extent the cyclical component of the budget balance plays a 
role in the analysis, we have used the cyclical and cyclically adjusted parts of the budget deficit 
separately. Therefore, capturing the structural and cyclical dimensions of the deficit leads to the 
estimation of equation 6. Looking at Table 4 for the case of fiscal rule and our large expanded 
sample, both components of the deficit positively clearly affect the debt level, particularly the 
structural part. While expenditures rules seem to negatively affect the debt level (despite not 
being statistically significantly different from zero), its interaction with the cyclical component 
of the deficit yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This means that an 
increase in the cyclical deficit when expenditure rules are in place lead to an increase in debt. 
A similar conclusion is also true with regard to the debt rule, but in this case, the impact of both 
deficit components is similarly positive. Finally, the existence of fiscal rules in which monitor 
compliance exist, contributes to lower the debt level, but the cyclical deficit partly counteracts 







4.4 Country Sample and Time Split 
As a first sensitivity exercise, we split our large heterogeneous sample between OECD 
and non-OECD countries. We observe in Table 5 – estimating equation 4 – that SFAs seem to 
be more important in positively changing the debt level in non-OECD countries (where the 
coefficient estimates and closer to 1 vis-à-vis the OECD). In addition, we see that in the OECD 
sub-sample the existence of debt rules lead of a rise in the debt level, an effect that is 
exacerbated when coupled with SFAs.  
In addition, in Table 6 in turn, we split the period before and after the Global Financial 
Crisis (in 2018). The crisis was indeed a major structural break in the sense that before, most 
fiscal rules seem to lower debt levels and had a clear actively constraining role in keeping 
government debt from rising. The order of magnitude of the fall in the debt level due to the 
presence of fiscal rules before the crisis was between 1.7-4.2 percent of GDP. After the crisis, 
both revenue-based and debt-based rules starting contributing positively to the accumulation of 






4.5 Other Robustness Exercises 
Our final exercise relates to stress-testing our previous results to alternative estimators. 
In particular, we run a pooled OLS, a within fixed effects estimator and the bias corrected least 
squares dummy variable. Results in Table 7 confirm the relevance of SFAs for the change in 
government debt. Without accounting for potential endogeneity, we get the nice result that the 
simple existence of fiscal rules lowers the public debt level (specifications 1, 4, 7). In addition, 
as before, both components of the deficit positively affect public debt, with the positive effect 




In addition to the robustness check to alternative estimators, we also employed an 
alternative method to extract the structural and cyclical components of the budget deficit. In 
particular, instead of relying on the IMF’s WEO measure of output gap, we rather apply the 
recent filtering technique developed by Hamilton (2017). Once the output gap is obtained, we 
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then used it to get a new measure of the cyclically adjusted balance. Reflecting the fact that the 
elasticity of government revenues (REV) to output growth is close to one while expenditure 
(EXP) is largely inelastic to growth (Girouard and André, 2005), we multiply government 
revenues by the factor [1/(1+OG/100)] to get REV_adj (revenue adjusted), with OG being the 
output gap obtain via the Hamilton filter. Then CAB=REV_adj - EXP.8 
The results from re-estimating equation 6 with system GMM and the new structural and 
cyclical deficit variables (and interaction terms) are not qualitatively different from the ones 
previously discussed (available upon request). 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
We have assessed how SFA contribute to the path of the debt-to-GDP ratio in a panel 
of 65 countries in the period 1985-2014. Therefore, and vis-à-vis previous related literature, we 
extend the coverage beyond developed economies to include also emerging and low-income 
countries, an aspect previously unexplored. In addition to inspecting the role of fiscal rules in 
affecting SFAs, we go deeper in the analysis by looking at different types and design 
characteristics of those rules. Furthermore, for a subsample of countries, we also rely on a recent 
dataset on fiscal institutions and examine which matter the most for the build-up of SFAs. 
Our main results are the following: i) SFAs contribute to the change in the level of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio with a coefficient close to one. ii) Fiscal rules in general did not led 
governments to a systematic use SFAs to lower deficits in our country sample. iii) Countries 
with some form of macro-fiscal forecasting tool in place have allowed governments to use SFAs 
to lower deficit. iv) The existence of fiscal rules in which monitor compliance exist, contributes 
to lower the debt level, although the cyclical deficit partly counteracts this desirable effect. v) 
The magnitude of the fall in the debt ratio due to the presence of fiscal rules before the crisis 
was between 1.7-4.2 percent of GDP. vi) After the GFC, both revenue-based and debt-based 
rules starting contributing positively to the accumulation of debt, a fact that is reinforced with 
the presence of large SFAs. 
Our results have a number of policy implications. First, it is important to notice the effect 
of the GFC in reversing, to some extent, the performance of the fiscal rules in curbing 
government debt developments. Hence, policy makers would need to integrate this result in the 
implementation and redefinition of such fiscal frameworks. Second, the fact that in some cases 
countries used the SFA with an impact on the development of general government debt, raises 
                                                          
8 Both revenues and expenditures come from the IMF WEO database. 
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the issue of being cautious when perceiving the dynamics of the intertemporal government 
budget constraint essentially via the primary balance, implying the need to further transparency 
in that context, to ensure the mitigation of such SFA. 
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Note: “sfa” denotes stock flow adjustments; “deficit” denotes the budget deficit; “bt-bt-1” denotes the change in 
the public debt level. 











































































































































































































































Figure 3. Distribution of New Fiscal Rules implemented over time by Income Group 
a) Advanced Economies b) Non-Advanced Economies 
































Table 1. Baseline, all countries, fiscal rules, equation (4), system GMM 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors           
lagged debt 0.10** 0.10** 0.09** 0.10** 0.10** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.027) (0.028) (0.035) (0.027) (0.027) 
SFA 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.90*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 
 (0.058) (0.049) (0.045) (0.061) (0.066) (0.024) (0.018) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) 
FR_1 -0.76          
 (0.622)          
SFA  x_FR 0.02          
 (0.072)          
ER  -0.18         
  (0.769)         
SFA x_ER  0.01         
  (0.106)         
RR   0.41        
   (1.065)        
SFA x RR   0.08        
   (0.095)        
BBR    -0.31       
    (0.626)       
SFA  xBBR    0.02       
    (0.077)       
DR     1.39      
     (0.978)      
SFA  x DR     0.15      
     (0.112)      
FR_monitor      -0.23     
      (0.854)     
SFA  x_FRmonitor      0.06*     
      (0.035)     
FR_enforce       -1.31    
       (0.943)    
SFA  x FRenforce       0.00    
       (0.072)    
FR_escape        -0.52   
        (1.736)   
SFA  x FRescapte        0.15   
        (0.401)   
Independent_monitor         0.11  
         (0.981)  
SFA x indepmonit         0.06**  
         (0.024)  
Transparency          -0.07 
          (0.899) 
SFA  x transp          0.05* 
          (0.029) 
           
Observations 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,140 1,378 865 1,353 1,378 
Hansen test (p-value) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ar2p 0.55 0.51 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.27 0.24 0.38 0.27 0.25 
ar1p 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP.Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in 
parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A 
constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. “FR_1” if a country has at least one fiscal rule; “ER” = expenditure rule in place; “RR” 
revenue rule in place; “DR” = debt rule in place; “BBR” = budget balance rule in place, “monitor” = at least one of the rules in 
place monitor compliance exist; “enforce” = at least one of the rules in place formal enforcement procedure exist; “escape” at 
least of the rules in place escape clause exist. “Independent_monitor” = an independent body monitors implementation of the 
rules. “transparency” = Fiscal Responsibility Laws are in place ensuring transparency and accountability. 













Table 2. Baseline, all countries, fiscal rules, equation (5), system GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
lagged debt 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.10*** 0.06 0.07 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092) (0.060) (0.059) (0.030) (0.060) (0.059) 
deficit 0.82*** 0.84*** 0.73*** 0.85*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 
 (0.249) (0.123) (0.159) (0.262) (0.195) (0.137) (0.126) (0.141) (0.131) (0.132) 
FR_1 2.24          
 (1.658)          
def_FR 0.03          
 (0.244)          
ER  2.07         
  (1.423)         
def_ER  -0.10         
  (0.269)         
RR   0.24        
   (1.803)        
def_RR   0.37        
   (0.232)        
BBR    2.40       
    (1.510)       
def_BBR    -0.03       
    (0.239)       
DR     -0.39      
     (1.200)      
def_DR     0.38*      
     (0.191)      
FR_monitor      -0.91     
      (1.570)     
def_FRmonitor      0.87*     
      (0.442)     
FR_enforce       1.81    
       (1.583)    
def_FRenforce       -0.40    
       (0.343)    
FR_escape        2.45   
        (3.680)   
def_FRescapte        -0.17   
        (1.302)   
Independent_monitor         -2.26  
         (1.867)  
def_indepmonit         1.31**  
         (0.635)  
Transparency          1.30 
          (1.847) 
def_transp          0.00 
          (0.391) 
           
Observations 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,140 1,378 865 1,353 1,378 
hansenp 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ar2p 0.83 0.77 0.88 0.84 0.77 0.40 0.36 0.57 0.40 0.37 
ar1p 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.07 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in 
parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A 
constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. “FR_1” if a country has at least one fiscal rule; “ER” = expenditure rule in place; 
“RR” revenue rule in place; “DR” = debt rule in place; “BBR” = budget balance rule in place, “monitor” = at least one of the 
rules in place monitor compliance exist; “enforce” = at least one of the rules in place formal enforcement procedure exist; 
“escape” at least of the rules in place escape clause exist. “Independent_monitor” = an independent body monitors 
implementation of the rules. “transparency” = Fiscal Responsibility Laws are in place ensuring transparency and accountability. 










Table 3. Baseline, all countries, fiscal institutions, equation (4), system GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
lagged debt 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.09* 0.12* 0.08* 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.046) (0.050) (0.059) (0.041) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) 
SFA 1.01*** 1.02*** 0.98*** 1.04*** 0.99*** 0.98** 1.00*** 1.04*** 1.06*** 
 (0.060) (0.018) (0.030) (0.036) (0.045) (0.357) (0.033) (0.032) (0.157) 
fr 0.92         
 (1.688)         
SFA_fr -0.04         
 (0.072)         
mf  0.20        
  (0.962)        
SFA _mf  -0.11**        
  (0.052)        
ifa   0.92       
   (1.584)       
SFA _ifa   -0.06       
   (0.117)       
fo    -0.20      
    (0.944)      
SFA _fo    -0.12      
    (0.106)      
mbf     -0.69     
     (1.700)     
SFA _mbf     -0.05     
     (0.085)     
be      4.50    
      (3.338)    
SFA _be      -0.01    
      (0.266)    
understanding       0.78   
       (1.427)   
SFA _understanding       -0.07   
       (0.069)   
developing        0.07  
        (1.540)  
SFA _developing        -0.09  
        (0.060)  
implementing         3.47 
         (2.884) 
SFA _implementing         -0.07 
         (0.136) 
          
Observations 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 
hansenp 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ar2p 0.77 0.72 0.82 0.78 0.72 0.37 0.34 0.53 0.37 0.35 
ar1p 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.07 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. LDV denotes lagged dependent variable. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for 
over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null 
is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. “fr”=fiscal reporting; “mf”=macro fiscal 
forecasting; “IFA”=independent fiscal agency; “fo” fiscal objectives; “MBF” medium term budget framework; “be” budget 
execution; “understanding”=understanding the scale and scope of the fiscal challenge; “developing” = developing a credible 
fiscal strategy; “implementing” = implementing the fiscal strategy through the budget process. 











Table 4. Baseline Augmented, all countries, fiscal rules, equation (6), system GMM 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
lagged debt 0.12* 0.10 0.11 0.12* 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.11 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.072) (0.069) (0.060) (0.086) (0.081) (0.078) (0.085) (0.082) 
cadef 0.52** 0.72*** 0.69*** 0.56** 0.51** 0.57*** 0.81*** 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.57*** 
 (0.244) (0.149) (0.171) (0.219) (0.210) (0.176) (0.183) (0.204) (0.150) (0.178) 
cyclicaldef_weo 0.35 0.39** 0.54** 0.47 0.30 0.26* 0.47** 1.14*** 0.49* 0.47** 
 (0.342) (0.177) (0.241) (0.414) (0.197) (0.155) (0.214) (0.403) (0.254) (0.209) 
FR_1 0.99          
 (1.722)          
cadef_FR 0.34          
 (0.323)          
cycdef_FR 0.09          
 (0.316)          
ER  -0.48         
  (1.624)         
cadef_ER  -0.01         
  (0.381)         
cycdef_ER  1.34**         
  (0.551)         
RR   -4.55        
   (4.171)        
cadef_RR   0.61        
   (0.705)        
cycdef_RR   -0.09        
   (1.195)        
BBR    0.86       
    (1.716)       
cadef_BBR    0.25       
    (0.291)       
cycdef_BBR    0.06       
    (0.356)       
DR     -1.26      
     (1.691)      
cadef_DR     0.62**      
     (0.255)      
cycdef_DR     0.66**      
     (0.317)      
FR_monitor      -3.60**     
      (1.573)     
cadef_FRmonitor      0.61*     
      (0.349)     
cycdef_FRmonitor      2.13**     
      (0.803)     
FR_enforce       0.16    
       (2.163)    
cadef_FRenforce       -0.36    
       (0.450)    
cycdef_FRenforce       0.83    
       (0.911)    
FR_escape        -1.27   
        (5.224)   
cadef_FRescapte        1.10   
        (2.946)   
cycdef_FRescapte        0.32   
        (1.384)   
Independent_monitor         -2.88  
         (2.918)  
cadef_indepmonit         0.48  
         (0.783)  
cycdef_indepmonit         1.60  
         (2.784)  
Transparency          -1.49 
          (1.969) 
cadef_transp          0.69 
          (0.483) 
cycdef_transp          1.51 
          (1.477) 
Observations 933 933 933 933 933 776 933 622 920 933 
hansenp 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ar2p 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.45 0.37 0.37 
ar1p 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.11 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in 
parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A 
constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. “FR_1” if a country has at least one fiscal rule; “ER” = expenditure rule in place; 
“RR” revenue rule in place; “DR” = debt rule in place; “BBR” = budget balance rule in place, “monitor” = at least one of the 
rules in place monitor compliance exist; “enforce” = at least one of the rules in place formal enforcement procedure exist; 
“escape” at least of the rules in place escape clause exist. “Independent_monitor” = an independent body monitors 
implementation of the rules. “transparency” = Fiscal Responsibility Laws are in place ensuring transparency and accountability. 
Fiscal rules dataset from Lledó et al (2017). 
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Table 5. Baseline, OECD vs non-OECD, fiscal rules, equation (4), system GMM 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Sample OECD Non-OECD 
lagged debt 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.05* 0.05* 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.056) (0.061) (0.045) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) 
SFA 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.71*** 0.77*** 0.57*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 
 (0.090) (0.133) (0.108) (0.122) (0.130) (0.036) (0.033) (0.026) (0.038) (0.023) 
FR_1 -0.02     -1.26     
 (1.216)     (1.115)     
SFA _FR 0.07     0.02     
 (0.162)     (0.062)     
ER  -0.99     -0.78    
  (1.464)     (1.924)    
SFA _ER  0.34     0.06    
  (0.274)     (0.040)    
RR   0.79     -1.62   
   (4.797)     (1.654)   
 SFA _RR   0.89     0.06   
   (0.613)     (0.089)   
BBR    -1.18     -1.82  
    (1.584)     (1.107)  
SFA _BBR    -0.01     0.02  
    (0.163)     (0.057)  
DR     2.23*     -0.76 
     (1.292)     (1.452) 
SFA _DR     0.56***     0.05 
     (0.175)     (0.074) 
           
Observations 822 822 822 822 822 514 514 514 514 514 
hansenp 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ar2p 0.66 0.61 0.70 0.67 0.61 0.32 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.29 
ar1p 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.06 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in 
parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A 
constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. “FR_1” if a country has at least one fiscal rule; “ER” = expenditure rule in place; 
“RR” revenue rule in place; “DR” = debt rule in place; “BBR” = budget balance rule in place. 























Table 6. Baseline, before vs after GFC, fiscal rules, equation (4), system GMM 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Time period Before GFC After GFC 
lagged debt 0.05* 0.05* 0.05 0.05 0.05* 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.053) (0.053) (0.049) (0.049) (0.043) 
SFA 0.93*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.92*** 0.91*** -0.01 0.48*** 0.71*** 0.91*** 0.33 
 (0.050) (0.057) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054) (0.493) (0.153) (0.139) (0.282) (0.282) 
FR_1 -1.68**     0.66     
 (0.645)     (1.140)     
SFA _FR -0.03     0.83*     
 (0.083)     (0.461)     
ER  -4.15**     -0.70    
  (1.728)     (0.719)    
SFA _ER  0.09     0.59***    
  (0.083)     (0.213)    
RR   -0.82     1.87*   
   (1.590)     (0.983)   
SFA _RR   0.07     0.18   
   (0.090)     (0.277)   
BBR    -1.69**     -1.67  
    (0.701)     (1.078)  
SFA _BBR    -0.01     -0.22  
    (0.082)     (0.314)  
DR     0.08     2.76*** 
     (1.025)     (0.908) 
SFA _DR     0.01     0.75** 
     (0.064)     (0.334) 
Observations 888 888 888 888 888 448 448 448 448 448 
hansenp 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ar2p 0.10 0.07 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.82 0.21 0.09 0.10 0.73 
ar1p 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in 
parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A 
constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. “FR_1” if a country has at least one fiscal rule; “ER” = expenditure rule in place; 
“RR” revenue rule in place; “DR” = debt rule in place; “BBR” = budget balance rule in place. 
Fiscal rules dataset from Lledó et al (2017). 
 
Table 7. Robustness to other estimations, equations (4, 5 ,6) 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Estimator  OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE LSDV LSDV LSDV 
Equation  Eq.4 Eq.5 Eq.6 Eq.4 Eq.5 Eq.6 Eq.4 Eq.5 Eq.6 
lagged debt 0.16*** 0.10 0.19* 0.12*** 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.13*** -0.06 
 (0.040) (0.091) (0.108) (0.029) (0.088) (0.092) (0.026) (0.040) (0.054) 
SFA 0.88***   0.98***   0.99***   
 (0.057)   (0.037)   (0.017)   
FR_1 -1.04*** 0.83 0.35 -1.14*** 1.58* 0.86 -0.85 1.79*** 0.89 
 (0.282) (0.700) (0.476) (0.230) (0.927) (0.936) (0.537) (0.513) (0.784) 
SFA _FR -0.08   -0.00   0.00   
 (0.076)   (0.042)   (0.024)   
deficit  0.45***   0.87***   0.94***  
  (0.127)   (0.156)   (0.099)  
def_FR  0.16   0.07   0.05  
  (0.124)   (0.123)   (0.099)  
cadef   0.35***   0.69***   0.75*** 
   (0.098)   (0.121)   (0.149) 
cyclicaldef_weo   0.26*   1.05***   1.19*** 
   (0.160)   (0.267)   (0.254) 
cadef_FR   0.23**   0.35***   0.35** 
   (0.101)   (0.122)   (0.157) 
cycdef_FR   0.15   -0.21   -0.22 
   (0.187)   (0.228)   (0.220) 
Observations 1,336 1,336 933 1,336 1,336 933 1,336 1,336 933 
R-squared 0.68 0.16 0.21 0.82 0.25 0.32 0.85 0.22 0.26 
Note: Dependent variable is the change in debt in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in 
parenthesis. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A 
constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony.  Specifications 4-6 include country and time 
fixed effects omitted for reasons of patrimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. “FR_1” if a country has at least one fiscal rule; “ER” = expenditure rule in place; “RR” revenue rule in place; 
“DR” = debt rule in place; “BBR” = budget balance rule in place. 





Table A1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observattions  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Debt 3708 57.17 48.38 0 789.83 
SFA 3708 -3.53 21.25 -590.09 180.41 
Deficit 3708 2.80 16.71 -122.18 557.49 
cadef 1377 2.42 3.78 -11.92 18.70 
cyclicaldef 1377 -0.12 2.76 -21.60 24.51 
FR 1370 0.68 0.46 0 1 
ER 1370 0.24 0.42 0 1 
RR 1370 0.12 0.32 0 1 
BBR 1370 0.62 0.48 0 1 
DR 1370 0.51 0.50 0 1 
FR_monitor 1170 0.17 0.38 0 1 
FR_enforce 1413 0.16 0.36 0 1 
FR_escape 888 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Independent monitor 1388 0.6 0.2 0 1 
Transparency 1413 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 
 
